Retreat and vulnerability

From Epicurus - that we value virtue, not because of the gods, but because living virtuously makes us happy (brings pleasure).

From Epictetus - that we cannot escape into "a Garden" - that the only thing we control is our virtue (our aversion and desire) - that the Epicurean path to happiness by retreating into the Garden and focusing on friendship is a formula for anxiety - for friends are externals and thus unpredictable - and we will never know when an intruder is about to scale the walls of the Garden. The quest for Epicurean ataraxia means constant vigilance, constant vulnerability to whoever intrudes, constant slavery to whoever can secure (or invade) our Garden.

The diseases of the soul...

Foucault, The Care of the Self, p.58:

And the establishment of the relationship to oneself as a sick individual is all the more necessary because the diseases of the soul - unlike those of the body - do not announce themselves by the suffering that one perceives; not only can they go undetected for a long time, but they blind those whom they afflict...

The insidious thing about the diseases of the soul is that they pass unnoticed, or even that one can mistake them for virtues (anger for courage, amorous passion for friendship, envy for emulation, cowardice for prudence).

Taking care of oneself is not a rest cure...

Foucault, The Care of the Self, pp. 50-51:

With regard to oneself as well, [the care of the self] implies labor. It takes time...[reflection, mediation, retreats to the country-side]...

The time is not empty; it is filled with exercises, practical tasks, various activities. Taking cure of oneself is not a rest cure. There is care of the body to consider...

There are the meditations, the reading, the notes that one takes on books or on conversations that one has heard, notes that one reads again later, the recollection of truths that one knows already but that need to more fully adapted to one's own life. Marcus Aurelius thus gives an example of "a retreat within oneself": it is a sustained effort in which general principles are reactivated and arguments are adduced that persuade one not to let oneself become angry at others, at providence, or at things.

There is also the talks that one has with a confidant, with friends, and with a guide or director.

Add to this the correspondence in which one reveals the state of one's soul, solicits advice, gives advice to anyone who needs it - which for that matter constitutes a beneficial exercise for the giver, who is called the preceptor, because he thereby reactualizes it for himself.

Around the care of the self, there developed an entire activity of speaking and writing in which the work of oneself on oneself and communication with others were linked together.

Evaluating Epictetus

1. His absolute faith in an all-knowing diety that controls the affairs of human beings, fitting together every event into an overall harmonious plan, is just nuts. To the extent that some of his assertions about ethics rest on rewards or punishments from God, these are hard to take seriously. We should be similarly skeptical about justifications for behavior that rest on "nature" as revealed by God to Epictetus.

2. His disinterest in natural science marks Epictetus as a highly superstitous, and insufficiently scientific, thinker.

3. Epictetus sometimes seems to be advocating pathological passivity. 'Your wife died? No, she was returned. My land was confiscated. No, it too was returned.' When you lose something, Epictetus counsels that you repeat the mantra "for such a small price I buy tranquillity and peace of mind." Sure it is good to keep losses in perspective and preserve virtue by not over-reacting, but what about under-reacting? Where does this end?

4. The friend-in-danger-indifference problem: Let's say you are duty-bound by virtue to come to the aid of a friend who faces danger from an external force. Let us also say that your friend is wise (for you would not be friends with someone who was not wise). Won't your friend recognize that the danger is an external, thus something to which he should be indifferent? And if what your friend faces is a matter of indifference, to him and to you, why bother lifting a finger? Aren't you in fact relieved of your duty to help your "friend in danger" because you (and he) have surmised he's not really in danger at all - he only faces decapitation if convicted - and the body (and head) are a matter of externals, thus things to which we are indifferent, and thus "the danger" is no real danger at all?

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1. Epictetus insists that we have the choice to respond to stimuli as we please. That's interesting.

2. Epictetus' refrain about being clear about what we control and what we don't control, and focusing on the former and de-emphasizing the latter, is life-changing advice (see The Serenity Prayer).

Epictetus on harmonious obscurity - sounding like Epicurus

From the Enchiridion, chapter 24.

"Is lack of distinction bad?" If others cause your obscurity, meaning obscurity is external, then obscurity can not be bad (nor good, I suppose). "And how can you be 'a nobody in obscurity' when you only have to be somebody in the areas you control..."

"Which would you rather have, anyway - money, or a worthy and faithful friend? So why not support me to that end, rather than asking me to engage in behavior that involves the loss of these qualities?"

"It is enough if everyone plays their respective part."

"Whatever position you are equipped to fill, so long as you preserve the man of trust and integrity."

Are those who focus on "externals" subhuman?

Epictetus, Discourses, Book II, Chapter 22:
"Just ask whether they put their self-interest in externals or in moral-choice. If it's in externals, you cannot call them friends, any more than you can call them trustworthy, consistent, courageous or free. You cannot even call them human beings, if you think about it."

Epictetus on friendship

In Discourses, Book II, 22, Epictetus essentially says that only wise men (people of virtue) can be true friends - after all if you are not dedicated to virtues like justice, honesty, loyalty and self-control, then what kind of friend can you be to someone else? And as an extension of this, people who are focused on externals - property, reputation, power - will turn on their "friends" as soon as doing so gives them an advantage in gaining those (external) things they truly crave.

So not only are the virtuous the only ones capable of being, and having, true friends, but since the virtuous are all virtuous in the same ways and all focused on the same priorities, the virtuous form a sort-of informal community of the like-minded who are all "friends" to each other.

"But if you hear of people who are sincere in identifying virtue with choice and the use of impressions, don't bother with whether they are members of the same family, or friends who've run together a long time; knowing this is enough to say with confidence that they are friends, just as it is enough to judge them fair and reliable."

With the attainment of virtue not only will one be "in a condition to befriend others - forming easy and natural relationships with like-minded people" but also one will know how to treat those who are not virtuous. Here Epictetus is tolerant, if pitying, when he notes that the virtuous are:

"...capable too of treating unenlightened souls with sympathy and indulgence, remembering that they are ignorant or mistaken about what's most important."

Kahneman, Epicurus, Happiness

1. Commuting, promotions and happiness: Epicurus warns us not to pursue unnecessary things like wealth and status, because the desire for these things is never satisfied and they lead to more pain than pleasure. Kahneman warns simply against pursuing a promotion that means more time in the office away from family and friends, or a longer commute that lengthens the worst part of your day.

"Many men who acquire wealth do not find deliverance from evils but an exchange of their present evils for greater ones." - Epicurus

Tacitus finds this view in Stoic thought as well:

With regard to practical matters they maintain that popular ideas of good and bad are wrong: many people who appear to be in dire circumstances are actually happy provided they deal with their situation bravely; others, regardless of how many possessions they have, are miserable, because they do not know how to use the gifts of fortune wisely.

2. Friends: For Epicurus, friendship is the key to happiness. Kahneman simply observes that people report being happiest when they are socializing with friends.

Friendship

"Of all the things that wisdom provides for living one's entire life in happiness, the greatest by far is the possession of friendship."

"The same knowledge that makes one confident that nothing dreadful is eternal or long-lasting, also recognizes in the face of these limited evils the security afforded by friendship."

Note that friendship is an outgrowth of virtue. It is the virtue of wisdom that provides for the possession of friendship. Is that because without virtue we would not attract friends, or not know how to act in order to keep them, or would fail to prize them highly enough to maintain the friendship?

- Epicurus