For those about to take charge of public affairs

Cicero, On Duties, Book I, p. 33

In general those who are about to take charge of public affairs should hold fast to Plato's two pieces of advice: first to fix their gaze so firmly on what is beneficial to the citizens that whatever they do, they do with that in mind, forgetful of their own advantage. Secondly, let them care for the whole body of the republic rather than protect one part and neglect the rest.

The virtue that fights on behalf of fairness

Cicero, On Duties, Book I, p.26

The Stoics define courage will when they call it the virtue which fights on behalf of fairness...a spirit which is ready to face danger, but is driven by selfish desire rather than common benefit should be called not courage, but audacity...it is a hateful fact that loftiness and greatness of spirit all too easily give birth to willfulness and excessive desire for pre-eminence...the loftier a man's spirit, the more easily he is driven by desire for glory to injustice. This is slippery ground indeed: scarcely a man can be found who, when he has undertaken toil and confronted dangers, does not yearn for glory as a kind of payment for his achievements.

Screwing your workers and giving to charity

Cicero, On Duties, Book I, p.19

Those who, in order to be liberal towards some, harm others, fall into the same injustice as if they had converted someone else's possessions to their own account. There are, though, many especially those greedy for renown and glory, who steal from one group the very money that they lavish upon another.

Promises should not be kept if they are disadvantageous to those to whom you have made them

Cicero, On Duties, Book I, p.13.

Nor, if they harm you more than they benefit the person who you have promised, is it contrary to good to prefer the greater good to the lesser. For example, if you had made an appointment to appear for someone as advocate in the near future, and in the meantime your son had fallen seriously ill, it would not be contrary to your duty not to do as you had said. Rather, the person to whom you had made the promise would be failing in his duty if he complained that he had been abandoned. Again, who does not see that if someone is forced to make a promise through fear, or deceived into it by trickery, the promise ought not stand?

Cicero is suggesting that the unethical behavior of others may relieve us of the obligation to fulfill out commitments. Where does this sort of reasoning end?

Epictetus on children and marriage

Foucault, The Care of the Self, p. 155:

[Epictetus] refers to the social obligations that no man must shirk and of which marriage forms a part, alongside the duties that pertain to political life, religion, and the family: 'citizenship, marriage, procreation of children, worship of God, care of parents.'

But not really. On page 156 Foucault says "it was the same with marriage as with all the other practices that the Stoics classed among the proegoumena, the things that are preferable. There may be circumstances in which it is not obligatory."

To halt of our own accord

Seneca, On Tranquility of Mind, X 6:

Nothing can free us from these mental waverings so effectively as always to establish some limit to advancement and not leave to Fortune the decision of when it shall end, but halt of our own accord.

Foucault, The Care of the Self, p. 93:

And to Lucilius, who is not under any threat, however, Seneca gives the advice to disengage himself from his duties, gradually and at the right time, just as Epicurus counseled, so as to be able to place himself at his own disposal.

A role beyond your means

Epictetus, Enchiridion, Chapter 37:

If you undertake a role beyond your means, you will not only embarrass yourself in that, you miss the chance of a role that you might have filled successfully.

Duties are broadly defined by social roles...

Epictetus, Enchiridion, Chapter 30:

...keep up your side of the relationship; don't concern yourself with his behavior, only with what you must do to keep your will in tune with nature. Another person will not hurt you without your cooperation; you are hurt the moment you believe yourself to be...give social relationships their due in your daily deliberations.

Persist and resist...

Epictetus, Fragments, 10:

...there are two vices much blacker and more serious than the rest: lack of persistence and lack of self-control...two words should be committed to memory and obeyed by alternately exhorting and restraining ourselves, words that will ensure we lead a mainly blameless and untroubled life...persist and resist.

Balancing acts

With Epictetus we balance careful attentiveness to external matters - as if our handling of those matters reflected the depth of our virtue - with a counterbalancing detachment from everything that is not related to personal virtue, and within my direct control.

Epictetus, Discourses, Book II, 17:
'I want to be free from fear and emotion, but at the same time I want to be a concerned citizen and philosopher, and attentive to my other duties, toward God, my parents, my siblings, my country and my guests.'

Morally wrong not to care...

Epictetus, Discourses, Book II, 5:

When it comes to externals, Epictetus warns, "...it is morally wrong not to care, and contrary to our nature. Be careful how you use them, because it's not unimportant - but at the same time be calm and composed, because things in themselves don't matter...it isn't easy to reconcile the two - the carefulness of the person devoted to externals and the dignity of one who's detached - but it's not impossible. Otherwise happiness would be impossible."

So that is the key to happiness - a balance between careful attentiveness to externals and the peacefulness of forming attachments only to one's virtue.

Another formulation is to say that externals matter because our conduct in handling externals reflects on our virtue: "externals I cannot control, but the choices I make in regards to them I do control. Where will I find good and bad? In me, in my choices."