Epictetus on friendship

In Discourses, Book II, 22, Epictetus essentially says that only wise men (people of virtue) can be true friends - after all if you are not dedicated to virtues like justice, honesty, loyalty and self-control, then what kind of friend can you be to someone else? And as an extension of this, people who are focused on externals - property, reputation, power - will turn on their "friends" as soon as doing so gives them an advantage in gaining those (external) things they truly crave.

So not only are the virtuous the only ones capable of being, and having, true friends, but since the virtuous are all virtuous in the same ways and all focused on the same priorities, the virtuous form a sort-of informal community of the like-minded who are all "friends" to each other.

"But if you hear of people who are sincere in identifying virtue with choice and the use of impressions, don't bother with whether they are members of the same family, or friends who've run together a long time; knowing this is enough to say with confidence that they are friends, just as it is enough to judge them fair and reliable."

With the attainment of virtue not only will one be "in a condition to befriend others - forming easy and natural relationships with like-minded people" but also one will know how to treat those who are not virtuous. Here Epictetus is tolerant, if pitying, when he notes that the virtuous are:

"...capable too of treating unenlightened souls with sympathy and indulgence, remembering that they are ignorant or mistaken about what's most important."