Friday, June 12, 2009

Epictetus and the Invisible Hand?

Discourse, Book I, Chapter 19
Due to divine design:
...man, incapable of attaining any of his private ends without at the same time providing for the community.

The upshot is that it is not anti-social to be constantly acting in one own's self-interest.

Not the thing itself, but our opinion about it...

...it isn't death, pain, exile or anything else you care to mention that accounts for the way we act, only our opinion about death, pain and the rest...

...Whenever we do something wrong, then, from now on we will not blame anything except the opinion on which it's based...wife, child, slave or neighbor - in the future we won't name any of them as the authors of the evil in our lives, in the knowledge that, unless we judge things in a particular light, we wont act in the corresponding manner. And we, not externals, are the masters of our judgements.

No one is ever unhappy because of someone else

Following a long discussion of why Stoics don't just kill themselves (after all, they have nothing to fear from losing the externals and returning to God), in which Epictetus asserts that we are to hold our station here on earth like a good soldier guarding his post because, basically, God wants us to, and because the tortures of this world aren't that bad anyway as long as we focus on virtue, Epictetus ends with this little gem:
...no one is ever unhappy because of someone else.

On the danger of distraction (especially those distractions in which we are successful)

So what can we expect if we take on this additional project, especially since it wont just distract us from weightier matters, but will be no small cause of pride and egotism?
From the chapter entitled - "That talents are treacherous for the uneducated"
(Discourses, Book I, Chapter 8)

You made the only mistake you had the opportunity to make

Why are we still lazy, indifferent and dull? Why do we look for excuses to avoid training and exercising our powers of reason?

'Look, if I err in such matters I haven't killed my father, have I?'

No, fool - for there was no father there for you to kill! What did you do instead? You made the only mistake you had the opportunity to make.

Armed with the virtue of fortitude

Why should I worry about what happens if I am armed with the virtue of fortitude? Nothing can trouble or upset me, or even seem annoying. Instead of meeting misfortune with groans and tears, I will call upon the faculty especially provided to deal with it.

'But my nose is running!' What do you have hands for, idiot, if not to wipe it?

'But how is it right that there be running noses in the first place?' Instead of thinking up protests, would not it be easier to just wipe your nose?

(Discourses, Book I, Chapter 6)

Tragedy

The context makes it clear that Epictetus is talking about dramatic tragedies, on stage:
For what else are tragedies but the ordeals of people who have come to value externals, tricked out in tragic verse?