Thursday, July 9, 2009

Dawkins channels Wittgenstein

Human suffering has been caused because too many of us cannot grasp that words are only tools for our use, and that the mere presence in the dictionary of a word like "living" does not mean it necessarily has to refer to something definite in the real world.
...universal love and the welfare of the species as a whole are concepts that simply do not make evolutionary sense.

For the overconfident

Cicero, On Duties, Book I, p. 36
...Men whom success has made unbridled and overconfident should be led into the training-ring of reason and learning, so that they perceive the frailty of human affairs and the variability of fortune.

An affable temper and loftiness of spirit

Cicero, On Duties, Book I, p.35
...We should not listen to those who think we should be deeply angry with our opponents, and consider that this is what a great-spirited and courageous man does. For nothing is more to be praised, nothing more worthy of a great and splendid man than to be easily appeased and forgiving.

For those about to take charge of public affairs

Cicero, On Duties, Book I, p. 33
In general those who are about to take charge of public affairs should hold fast to Plato's two pieces of advice: first to fix their gaze so firmly on what is beneficial to the citizens that whatever they do, they do with that in mind, forgetful of their own advantage. Secondly, let them care for the whole body of the republic rather than protect one part and neglect the rest.

The virtue that fights on behalf of fairness

Cicero, On Duties, Book I, p.26
The Stoics define courage will when they call it the virtue which fights on behalf of fairness...a spirit which is ready to face danger, but is driven by selfish desire rather than common benefit should be called not courage, but audacity...it is a hateful fact that loftiness and greatness of spirit all too easily give birth to willfulness and excessive desire for pre-eminence...the loftier a man's spirit, the more easily he is driven by desire for glory to injustice. This is slippery ground indeed: scarcely a man can be found who, when he has undertaken toil and confronted dangers, does not yearn for glory as a kind of payment for his achievements.

A drive to procreate

Cicero, On Duties, Book I, p.23
For since it is by nature common to all animals that they have a drive to procreate, the first fellowship exists within marriage itself, and the next with one's children.

Doing splendidly if they have in them mere images of virtue

Cicero, On Duties, Book I, p.20
Since we do not live with men who are perfect and clearly wise, but with those who are doing splendidly if the have in them mere images of virtue, I think that we must understand this too: no one should be wholly neglected if any indication of virtue appears in him; moreover, one must particularly foster those who are most graced with the gentler virtues, modesty, restraint and [justice]...for a brave and great spirit in a man who is not perfect nor wise is generally too impetuous; but those other virtues seem rather to attach themselves to a good man.

Screwing your workers and giving to charity

Cicero, On Duties, Book I, p.19
Those who, in order to be liberal towards some, harm others, fall into the same injustice as if they had converted someone else's possessions to their own account. There are, though, many especially those greedy for renown and glory, who steal from one group the very money that they lavish upon another.

Promises should not be kept if they are disadvantageous to those to whom you have made them

Cicero, On Duties, Book I, p.13.
Nor, if they harm you more than they benefit the person who you have promised, is it contrary to good to prefer the greater good to the lesser. For example, if you had made an appointment to appear for someone as advocate in the near future, and in the meantime your son had fallen seriously ill, it would not be contrary to your duty not to do as you had said. Rather, the person to whom you had made the promise would be failing in his duty if he complained that he had been abandoned. Again, who does not see that if someone is forced to make a promise through fear, or deceived into it by trickery, the promise ought not stand?
Cicero is suggesting that the unethical behavior of others may relieve us of the obligation to fulfill out commitments. Where does this sort of reasoning end?

Cicero on premeditated injustice

Cicero, On Duties, Book I, p.12
In every case of injustice it matters a great deal whether the injury was committed through some agitation of the spirit, which is generally brief and momentary, or purposefully and with some forethought. For those things that happen because of some sudden impulse are less serious than those inflicted after reflection and preparation.

Apply some limit

Cicero, On Duties, Book I, p.8
For we shall conserve honorableness and seemliness if we apply some limit and order to the things with which we deal in our life.