The "Crimes and Misdemeanors" challenge

Doesn't it follow from Epicurus that if you are not virtuous and it doesn't bother you, then that's fine too?

Certainly the gods won't intercede to punish you.

You may lack true friends, because you are not just and trustworthy, but what do you care for true friends?

You will suffer guilt and apprehension at your wrong-doing only if you are capable of feeling those emotions. If not, you'll suffer no consequences short of formal, external punishment (and being caught and punished is far from certain).

Epicurus' system does not really account for sociopaths - except to say that it is always good to find ways to protect yourself from other men (acknowledging that there are bad people out there).

Retreat and vulnerability

From Epicurus - that we value virtue, not because of the gods, but because living virtuously makes us happy (brings pleasure).

From Epictetus - that we cannot escape into "a Garden" - that the only thing we control is our virtue (our aversion and desire) - that the Epicurean path to happiness by retreating into the Garden and focusing on friendship is a formula for anxiety - for friends are externals and thus unpredictable - and we will never know when an intruder is about to scale the walls of the Garden. The quest for Epicurean ataraxia means constant vigilance, constant vulnerability to whoever intrudes, constant slavery to whoever can secure (or invade) our Garden.

Epictetus on children and marriage

Foucault, The Care of the Self, p. 155:

[Epictetus] refers to the social obligations that no man must shirk and of which marriage forms a part, alongside the duties that pertain to political life, religion, and the family: 'citizenship, marriage, procreation of children, worship of God, care of parents.'

But not really. On page 156 Foucault says "it was the same with marriage as with all the other practices that the Stoics classed among the proegoumena, the things that are preferable. There may be circumstances in which it is not obligatory."

To halt of our own accord

Seneca, On Tranquility of Mind, X 6:

Nothing can free us from these mental waverings so effectively as always to establish some limit to advancement and not leave to Fortune the decision of when it shall end, but halt of our own accord.

Foucault, The Care of the Self, p. 93:

And to Lucilius, who is not under any threat, however, Seneca gives the advice to disengage himself from his duties, gradually and at the right time, just as Epicurus counseled, so as to be able to place himself at his own disposal.

The diseases of the soul...

Foucault, The Care of the Self, p.58:

And the establishment of the relationship to oneself as a sick individual is all the more necessary because the diseases of the soul - unlike those of the body - do not announce themselves by the suffering that one perceives; not only can they go undetected for a long time, but they blind those whom they afflict...

The insidious thing about the diseases of the soul is that they pass unnoticed, or even that one can mistake them for virtues (anger for courage, amorous passion for friendship, envy for emulation, cowardice for prudence).

Taking care of oneself is not a rest cure...

Foucault, The Care of the Self, pp. 50-51:

With regard to oneself as well, [the care of the self] implies labor. It takes time...[reflection, mediation, retreats to the country-side]...

The time is not empty; it is filled with exercises, practical tasks, various activities. Taking cure of oneself is not a rest cure. There is care of the body to consider...

There are the meditations, the reading, the notes that one takes on books or on conversations that one has heard, notes that one reads again later, the recollection of truths that one knows already but that need to more fully adapted to one's own life. Marcus Aurelius thus gives an example of "a retreat within oneself": it is a sustained effort in which general principles are reactivated and arguments are adduced that persuade one not to let oneself become angry at others, at providence, or at things.

There is also the talks that one has with a confidant, with friends, and with a guide or director.

Add to this the correspondence in which one reveals the state of one's soul, solicits advice, gives advice to anyone who needs it - which for that matter constitutes a beneficial exercise for the giver, who is called the preceptor, because he thereby reactualizes it for himself.

Around the care of the self, there developed an entire activity of speaking and writing in which the work of oneself on oneself and communication with others were linked together.

A whole attitude of severity...

Foucault, The Care of the Self, p.39:

A mistrust of the pleasures, an emphasis on the consequences of their abuse for the body and the soul, a valorization of marriage and marital obligations, a disaffection with regard to the spiritual meanings imputed to the love of boys: a whole attitude of severity was manifested in the thinking of philosophers and physicians in the course of the first two centuries.

...as if he were his own enemy lying in ambush

Epictetus, Enchiridion, Chapter 48:

The mark and attitude of the ordinary man: never look for help or harm from yourself, only from outsiders. The mark and attitude of the philosopher: look for help and harm exclusively from yourself.

And the signs of a person making progress: he never criticizes, praises, blames or points the finger, or represents himself as knowing or amounting to anything. If he experiences frustration or disappointment, he points the finger at himself. If he is praised, he is more amused than elated. And if he is criticized, he won't bother to respond. He walks around as if he were an invalid, careful not to move a healing limb before it's at full strength. He has expunged all desire, and made the things that are contrary to nature and in his control the sole target of his aversion. Impulse he only uses with detachment. He does not care if he comes across as stupid or naive. In a word, he keeps an eye on himself as if he were his own enemy lying in ambush.

A role beyond your means

Epictetus, Enchiridion, Chapter 37:

If you undertake a role beyond your means, you will not only embarrass yourself in that, you miss the chance of a role that you might have filled successfully.

Finishing school for philosophers

Epictetus, Enchiridion, Chapter 33:

1. Settle on the type of person you want to be and stick to it...
2. Let silence be your goal...say only what is necessary and be brief about it...above all don't gossip about people, praising, blaming or comparing them. Try to influence your friends to speak appropriately by your example. If you find yourself in unfamiliar company, however, keep quiet.
3. Keep laughter to a minimum...
4. Avoid fraternizing with non-philosophers...
5. [Moderation in food, drink, sex...]
6. If you learn that someone is speaking ill of you, don't try to defend yourself against the rumors; respond instead with 'Yes, and he doesn't know the half of it, because he could have said more.'
7. [Stay away from crude amusements...]
8. When you are going to meet someone, especially someone deemed important, imagine to yourself what Socrates or Zeno would have done in that situation and you won't fail to get on, whatever happens. When you are going to house of someone influential, tell yourself that you won't find them in, that you will be locked out, that the door will be slammed in your face, that they won't give you the time of day. And, despite that, if it's the right thing to go, then go and face the consequences...
9. ...don't dwell at excessive length on your own deeds and adventures...
10. And avoid trying to be funny...
11. [don't swear too much...]
    

Duties are broadly defined by social roles...

Epictetus, Enchiridion, Chapter 30:

...keep up your side of the relationship; don't concern yourself with his behavior, only with what you must do to keep your will in tune with nature. Another person will not hurt you without your cooperation; you are hurt the moment you believe yourself to be...give social relationships their due in your daily deliberations.

A person who will not stoop to flattery...

Epictetus, Enchiridion, Chapter 25:

...if you do not engage in the same acts as others with a view to gaining such honors, you cannot expect the same results. A person who will not stoop to flattery does not get to have the flatterer's advantages...refuse to praise someone and you cannot expect the same compensation as a flatterer. It would be unfair and greedy on your part, then, to decline to pay the price that these privileges entail and hope to get them for free.

All such apparent tragedies...

Epictetus, Enchiridion, Chapter 21:

Keep the prospect of death, exile and all such apparent tragedies before you every day - especially death - and you will never have an abject thought, or desire anything to excess.

Put up with being perceived as ignorant

Epictetus, Enchiridion, Chapter 13:

If you want to make progress, put up with being perceived as ignorant or naive in worldly matters, don't aspire to a reputation for sagacity. If you do impress others as somebody, don't altogether believe it. You have to realize, it isn't easy to keep your will in agreement with nature, as well as externals. Caring about the one inevitably means you are going to shortchange the other.

Compare with Gracian, who would suggest we hide the depth of our knowledge, but for strategic reasons, and in order to increase our ability to manipulate and surprise others.

Advice to those just starting out: keep it simple

Epictetus, Enchiridion, Chapter 2:

Direct aversion only towards things that are under your control and alien to your nature, and you will not fall victim to any of the things that you dislike...as for desire, suspend it completely for now...restrict yourself to choice and refusal, and exercise them carefully with discipline and detachment.

Epictetus, Enchiridion, Chapter 8:

Don't hope that events will turn out the way you want, welcome events in whichever way they happen: this is the path to peace.

Advice to those just starting out: rehearse

Epictetus, Enchiridion, Chapter 4:

Whenever planning an action, mentally rehearse what the plan entails... 'I want [to do x], but at the same time I want to keep my will aligned with nature.' Do it with every act. That way if something occurs to spoil your [plans], you will have ready the thought, 'Well this was not my only intention, I also meant to keep my will in line with nature - which is impossible if I go all to pieces whenever anything bad happens.'

Persist and resist...

Epictetus, Fragments, 10:

...there are two vices much blacker and more serious than the rest: lack of persistence and lack of self-control...two words should be committed to memory and obeyed by alternately exhorting and restraining ourselves, words that will ensure we lead a mainly blameless and untroubled life...persist and resist.

A warning about what makes other people tick...

Epictetus, Discourses, Book IV, 13:

...if you see someone fond of externals, someone who values them over their own moral integrity, you can be sure that he is vulnerable to thousands of people who can frustrate or coerce him.

Here's the sort of formulation that gives Stoicism a bad name...

Epictetus, Discourses, Book IV, 4:

It would be lovelier still if you could secure happiness, free of emotion, poised and dependent on no one except yourself.

Here the view of emotion is overly simplistic: emotion equals weakness. The role of emotion in motivation (for virtues like courage), attention, or even the proper functioning of memory, is completely unrecognized.

If you observe rather than are observed...

Epictetus, Discourses, Book IV, 4:

If you keep yourself calm, poised and dignified, if you observe rather than are observed, if you don't envy people with greater success, don't let externals disconcert you - if you do all this, what more do you need?

Warnings against advancement

Epictetus, Book IV, 1:

When a man gain's Caesar's friendship, does he stop being hindered or constrained, does he live in peace and happiness?...So step up, sir, and tell us, when did you sleep more soundly, now or before you became intimate with Caesar? 'By the gods, stop mocking my condition. You don't know what agonies I endure. I can't even fall off to sleep before someone comes and announces, "The emperor is up already, and about to make his appearance," and then I am harassed by one worry and crisis after another...He says that if he's not invited to dine with Caesar, he's an emotional wreck; and if he is invited he behaves like a slave asked to sit beside his master, anxious the whole time lest he do or say something gauche. Is he afraid that, like a slave, he'll get whipped? He should be so lucky. As befits a personage as lofty as a friend of Caesar, he's afraid his head will be chopped off...

...in a word, which life would you prefer, the present or the previous one? I could swear that there is no one so crude or forgetful that they don't actually regret their fortune in precise proportion to how close to Caesar they've become.'

Musonius stakes out the pro-marriage, pro-kids position

Hence, it is clear that it is appropriate for the philosopher to devote attention to marriage and the production of children.

Musonius points to the gods - they got married - and to nature - clearly the gods intended man to marry and procreate, and if that's what is intended for man then that is what is intended for the philosophers that walk among man.

Also, note that Epictetus had strong feelings about the sanctity of marriage vows (though he suggested philosophers should not marry), made clear in his reprimands to the wayward senator.

Epictetus sounding unrealistically harsh...

Epictetus, Discourses, Book II, 16:

Every day you should put the ideas in action that protect against attachment to externals such as individual people, places or institutions - even your own body. Remember the law of God and keep it constantly in view: look to your own means, leave everything that isn't yours alone.

If by "leave everything that isn't yours alone" Epictetus suggests we should bring less than attentive devotion to the externals around us, he contradicts his earlier statements.

And the detachment he sets as a standard here sounds so unlikely.

Between Epictetus and Epicurus

What do they really disagree on? The omnipresence of god and the power of fate.

Epictetus suggests we know what is right because it is revealed to us by god - things are as they "seem" - while Epicurus says we direct ourselves towards the good by doing what brings us pleasure and by avoiding pain.

Epictetus draws the sharp line between what is external and internal; what is beyond my control and what is within it; and good and bad reside only in what is internal, what is within my control, and done through my choice. What's more:

It is a general rule that externals of any kind, if we attach importance to them, make us subject to somebody. (Discourses, Book IV, 4)

Epicurus draws lines among what he sees as, respectively, good and bad externals - those in accordance with nature versus those that are not.

Balancing acts

With Epictetus we balance careful attentiveness to external matters - as if our handling of those matters reflected the depth of our virtue - with a counterbalancing detachment from everything that is not related to personal virtue, and within my direct control.

Epictetus, Discourses, Book II, 17:
'I want to be free from fear and emotion, but at the same time I want to be a concerned citizen and philosopher, and attentive to my other duties, toward God, my parents, my siblings, my country and my guests.'

Morally wrong not to care...

Epictetus, Discourses, Book II, 5:

When it comes to externals, Epictetus warns, "...it is morally wrong not to care, and contrary to our nature. Be careful how you use them, because it's not unimportant - but at the same time be calm and composed, because things in themselves don't matter...it isn't easy to reconcile the two - the carefulness of the person devoted to externals and the dignity of one who's detached - but it's not impossible. Otherwise happiness would be impossible."

So that is the key to happiness - a balance between careful attentiveness to externals and the peacefulness of forming attachments only to one's virtue.

Another formulation is to say that externals matter because our conduct in handling externals reflects on our virtue: "externals I cannot control, but the choices I make in regards to them I do control. Where will I find good and bad? In me, in my choices."

Religious foundations of courage

"Your duty is to prepare for death and imprisonment, torture and exile - and all such evils - with confidence, because you have faith in the one who has called on you to face them, having judged your worthy of the role. When you take on the role, you will show the superiority of reason and the mind over forces unconnected with the will."

Two things to note.

1. Epictetus uses the word "reason" to refer to fanatical religious faith.

2. If you don't share that deep faith, what solace does Epictetus' reasoning provide in the face of death, imprisonment, torture, and exile? Epictetus suggests that these misfortunes are bearable because we know them to be part of god's will. But what if we don't believe in Epictetus' highly anthropomorphic, micro-managing god? Aren't these then just terrible, senseless, random things, and if so, from what do we draw courage to bear up?

What seems best...

Epictetus doesn't spend much time clarifying how we will know our ethical obligation when we see it.

As a potential counter to the friend-in-danger-indifference problem raised in a previous post, Epictetus offers "Abide by what seems best as if it were an inviolable law."

As a guide for knowing what "is best" this is pretty shaky.

Perhaps Epictetus believes that the gods reveal to us what we should do, in the form of the feeling "seems best", so we can trust that feeling. That requires great faith, beyond logic.

Barring divine intervention however, much of what we currently believe about people's inability to predict future states draws this confidence into question.

Evaluating Epictetus

1. His absolute faith in an all-knowing diety that controls the affairs of human beings, fitting together every event into an overall harmonious plan, is just nuts. To the extent that some of his assertions about ethics rest on rewards or punishments from God, these are hard to take seriously. We should be similarly skeptical about justifications for behavior that rest on "nature" as revealed by God to Epictetus.

2. His disinterest in natural science marks Epictetus as a highly superstitous, and insufficiently scientific, thinker.

3. Epictetus sometimes seems to be advocating pathological passivity. 'Your wife died? No, she was returned. My land was confiscated. No, it too was returned.' When you lose something, Epictetus counsels that you repeat the mantra "for such a small price I buy tranquillity and peace of mind." Sure it is good to keep losses in perspective and preserve virtue by not over-reacting, but what about under-reacting? Where does this end?

4. The friend-in-danger-indifference problem: Let's say you are duty-bound by virtue to come to the aid of a friend who faces danger from an external force. Let us also say that your friend is wise (for you would not be friends with someone who was not wise). Won't your friend recognize that the danger is an external, thus something to which he should be indifferent? And if what your friend faces is a matter of indifference, to him and to you, why bother lifting a finger? Aren't you in fact relieved of your duty to help your "friend in danger" because you (and he) have surmised he's not really in danger at all - he only faces decapitation if convicted - and the body (and head) are a matter of externals, thus things to which we are indifferent, and thus "the danger" is no real danger at all?

---

1. Epictetus insists that we have the choice to respond to stimuli as we please. That's interesting.

2. Epictetus' refrain about being clear about what we control and what we don't control, and focusing on the former and de-emphasizing the latter, is life-changing advice (see The Serenity Prayer).

Epictetus, again, with the quiet life

Epictetus, Enchiridion, 15

...wealth and status...decline these goods even when they are on offer and you will have a share in the gods' power as well as their company.

Living quietly

Perhaps in response to Epicurus, Epictetus rails against "those intent on living quietly."

"A quiet life," for Epictetus, is just another possession, an external that threatens to enslave he who desires it - "you will always have to serve the person who can secure your release, or the person who cab block your way."

Instead, the goal is to be "happy, unflappable and equal to every occasion" even if circumstances call for you assume responsibilities.

You who seeks the quiet life are just like the masses, "the only difference being that they are afraid they will not hold office, while you are afraid you will."

Epictetus has a point on the Epicurean notion of retreat into the quiet life - you always remain vulnerable to anyone who can disrupt your peaceful setting. Epicurus is aware of this, and views as "good" anything that protects you from other people. But that just highlights how physically (external) vulnerable we are, most of the time, to other people.

Epicurus would also counter with something like 'be realistic - you are going to apply yourself to some external activities. Just be sure those activities bring you pleasure, not pain; and the quiet life is the path most conducive to pleasure.'

My experience is what I agree to attend to.

William James (Principles, 1:402)

Millions of items of the outward order are present to my senses which never properly enter into my experience. Why? Because they have no interest for me. My experience is what I agree to attend to. Only those items which I notice shape my mind - without selective interest, experience is utter chaos. Interest alone gives accent and emphasis, light and shade, background and foreground - intelligible perspective, in a word.

The soul takes on the color of your thoughts

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, Book Five, 16:

The things you think about determine the quality of your mind. The soul takes on the color of your thoughts.

On moving towards virtue, imperfectly

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, Book Five, 9:

Not to feel exasperated, or defeated, or despondent because your days aren't packed with wise and moral actions. But to get back up when you fail, to celebrate behaving like a human - however imperfectly - and fully embrace the pursuit that you've embarked on.

Justice

Which words are used to describe the virtue of Justice?

Seneca: justice, upright (Letters from a Stoic, XC, LXXVIII)

Marcus Aurelius: honesty, gravity, sincerity (Meditations, Book 5, 5); straightforward, considerate (Book 3, 4)

Prudence

Which words are used to describe the virtue of prudence?

Seneca: moral insight (Letters from a Stoic, XC)

Marcus Aurelius: gravity, seriousness, high-mindedness (Meditations, Book 5, 5)

Fortitude

Which words are used to describe the virtue of fortitude?

Seneca: courage, bravery (Seneca, Letters from a Stoic, LXXVII); fortitude (Tacitus' account of Seneca's Death)

Marcus Aurelius: endurance (Meditations, Book 5, 5)

Temperance

Which words are used to describe the virtue of temperance?

Seneca: self-control

Marcus Aurelius: austerity, abstinence, moderation, patience, resignation (Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, Book Five, 5)

No one could ever accuse you of being quick-witted.

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, Book Five, 5:

No one could ever accuse you of being quick-witted.
Alright, but there are plenty of other things you can't claim you "haven't got in you." Practice the virtues you can show: honesty, gravity, endurance, austerity, resignation, abstinence, patience, sincerity, moderation, seriousness, high-mindedness.

Stop being jerked like a puppet

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, Book Seven, 29:

Discard your misperceptions.
Stop being jerked like a puppet.
Limit yourself to the present.

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, Book Four, 2:

No random actions, none not based on underlying principles.

"If you seek tranquility, do less"

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, Book Four, 24:

"If you seek tranquility, do less." Or (more accurately) do what's essential - what the logos of a social being requires, and in the requisite way. Which brings a double satisfaction: to do less, better.

Be your own savior while you can...

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, Book Three, 14:

Stop drifting...sprint for the finish. Write off your hopes, and if your well-being matters to you, be your own savior while you can.

Brevity of life

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, Book Three, 10:

Forget everything else. Keep hold of this alone and remember it: Each of us lives only now, this brief instant.

How to act

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, Book Three, 5:

Never under compulsion, out of selfishness, without forethought, with misgivings.
Don't gussy up your thoughts.
No surplus words or unnecessary actions.

Life is warfare and a journey far from home...

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, Book Seven, 61:

Not a dancer but a wrestler: waiting, poised and dug in, for sudden assaults.

Be brave, nature-boy

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 9:

That you are part of nature, and no one can prevent you from speaking and acting in harmony with it, always.

Compare with one of the more uplifting sentiments from Gracian in which he counsels us to "side with reason," seemingly (and uncharacteristically) regardless of consequences.

On the nexus of virtue and focused attention

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 5:

Concentrate every minute like a Roman - like a man - on doing what's in front of you with precise and genuine seriousness, tenderly, willingly, with justice. And on freeing yourself from other distractions. Yes, you can - if you do everything as if it were the last thing you were doing in your life, and stop being aimless, stop letting your emotions override what your mind tells you, stop being hypocritical, self-centered, irritable.

Don't die on every hill

Discourses, Book I, Chapter 29

When children come up to us clapping their hands and shouting, 'Today is good Saturnalia,' do we say, 'The Saturnalia is not "good"?' Of course not, we clap out hands right along with them. As for you, if you can't change a person's mind, realize that he is no more than a child - and clap hands with him. And if you can't bring yourself to do that, then just keep quiet.

And from Marcus Aurelius (Meditations, 50)

Do your best to convince them. But act on your own if justice requires it. If met with force, then fall back on acceptance and peaceability. Use the set-back to practice other virtues.

Remember that our efforts are subject to circumstances; you weren't aiming to do the impossible.

- Aiming to do what, then?

To try. And you succeeded. What you set out to do is accomplished.

Our actions are all determined by our impressions

Epictetus, Discourses, Book I, 28:

Whoever keeps in mind that our actions are all determined by our impressions, which can be either right or wrong...whoever keeps this in mind will not be angry or upset with anyone, won't curse, blame, resent or malign anyone either.

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, Book Four, 7:

Choose not to be harmed - and you won't feel harmed.
Don't feel harmed - and you haven't been.

The approval of lunatics

Discourses, Book I, Chapter 22

And who exactly are these people that you want to be admired by? Aren't they the same people you are in the habit of calling crazy? And is this your life ambition, then - to win the approval of lunatics?

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, Book 2, 12:

...the real nature of the things our senses experience, especially those that entice us with pleasure or frighten us with pain or are loudly trumpeted by pride. To understand those things - how stupid, contemptible, grimy, decaying and dead they are - that's what our intellectual powers are for. And to understand what those people really amount to, whose opinions and voices constitute fame.

On testing

Therefore the first and most important duty of the philosopher is to test impressions, choosing between them and only deploying those that have passed the test.

Discourses, Book I, Chapter 20

Epictetus and the Invisible Hand?

Discourse, Book I, Chapter 19
Due to divine design:

...man, incapable of attaining any of his private ends without at the same time providing for the community.

The upshot is that it is not anti-social to be constantly acting in one own's self-interest.

Not the thing itself, but our opinion about it...

...it isn't death, pain, exile or anything else you care to mention that accounts for the way we act, only our opinion about death, pain and the rest...

...Whenever we do something wrong, then, from now on we will not blame anything except the opinion on which it's based...wife, child, slave or neighbor - in the future we won't name any of them as the authors of the evil in our lives, in the knowledge that, unless we judge things in a particular light, we wont act in the corresponding manner. And we, not externals, are the masters of our judgements.

No one is ever unhappy because of someone else

Following a long discussion of why Stoics don't just kill themselves (after all, they have nothing to fear from losing the externals and returning to God), in which Epictetus asserts that we are to hold our station here on earth like a good soldier guarding his post because, basically, God wants us to, and because the tortures of this world aren't that bad anyway as long as we focus on virtue, Epictetus ends with this little gem:

...no one is ever unhappy because of someone else.

On the danger of distraction (especially those distractions in which we are successful)

So what can we expect if we take on this additional project, especially since it wont just distract us from weightier matters, but will be no small cause of pride and egotism?

From the chapter entitled - "That talents are treacherous for the uneducated"
(Discourses, Book I, Chapter 8)

You made the only mistake you had the opportunity to make

Why are we still lazy, indifferent and dull? Why do we look for excuses to avoid training and exercising our powers of reason?

'Look, if I err in such matters I haven't killed my father, have I?'

No, fool - for there was no father there for you to kill! What did you do instead? You made the only mistake you had the opportunity to make.

Armed with the virtue of fortitude

Why should I worry about what happens if I am armed with the virtue of fortitude? Nothing can trouble or upset me, or even seem annoying. Instead of meeting misfortune with groans and tears, I will call upon the faculty especially provided to deal with it.

'But my nose is running!' What do you have hands for, idiot, if not to wipe it?

'But how is it right that there be running noses in the first place?' Instead of thinking up protests, would not it be easier to just wipe your nose?

(Discourses, Book I, Chapter 6)

Tragedy

The context makes it clear that Epictetus is talking about dramatic tragedies, on stage:

For what else are tragedies but the ordeals of people who have come to value externals, tricked out in tragic verse?

"The tyranny of fortune" - Descartes, sounding like Epictetus

As pointed out by Robert Dobbin, in his introduction to The Discourses and Selected Writings.

Rene Descartes:

I undertook to conquer myself rather than fortune, and to alter my desires rather than change the order of the world, and to accustom myself to believe that nothing is entirely in our power except our own thoughts...Here, I think, is the secret of those ancient philosophers who were able to free themselves from the tyranny of fortune, or, despite suffering and poverty, to rival the gods in happiness.

Epictetus on harmonious obscurity - sounding like Epicurus

From the Enchiridion, chapter 24.

"Is lack of distinction bad?" If others cause your obscurity, meaning obscurity is external, then obscurity can not be bad (nor good, I suppose). "And how can you be 'a nobody in obscurity' when you only have to be somebody in the areas you control..."

"Which would you rather have, anyway - money, or a worthy and faithful friend? So why not support me to that end, rather than asking me to engage in behavior that involves the loss of these qualities?"

"It is enough if everyone plays their respective part."

"Whatever position you are equipped to fill, so long as you preserve the man of trust and integrity."

Epictetus, Plato and Popper on truth

In discussing sympathy for the ignorant, Epictetus approvingly quotes Plato:

"Every soul is deprived of the truth against its will."

Compare this with Popper's criticism of conspiracy theories of ignorance. Truth, Popper says, is hard to find and easy to lose. The failure of those around us to grasp the truth requires no elaborate explanation, no blame, no uncovering of any agent's intentional acts to hide and confuse. People can get confused, and stay confused, all on their own. It is the natural state of most people most of the time. Or as Plato suggests, ignorance need not be an act of will on anyone's part.

Epictetus applies this in Book I, Chapter 18 - "Don't be angry with wrongdoers." Epictetus suggests that thieves are acting in accordance with an undeniable law of human nature - that people conform to a view because they believe that is must be true, and they act according to what they believe is their best interest. Thieves are, of course, wrong both about what is true and what is in their interest, but this is a cause for pity, not anger.

Are those who focus on "externals" subhuman?

Epictetus, Discourses, Book II, Chapter 22:
"Just ask whether they put their self-interest in externals or in moral-choice. If it's in externals, you cannot call them friends, any more than you can call them trustworthy, consistent, courageous or free. You cannot even call them human beings, if you think about it."

Epictetus on friendship

In Discourses, Book II, 22, Epictetus essentially says that only wise men (people of virtue) can be true friends - after all if you are not dedicated to virtues like justice, honesty, loyalty and self-control, then what kind of friend can you be to someone else? And as an extension of this, people who are focused on externals - property, reputation, power - will turn on their "friends" as soon as doing so gives them an advantage in gaining those (external) things they truly crave.

So not only are the virtuous the only ones capable of being, and having, true friends, but since the virtuous are all virtuous in the same ways and all focused on the same priorities, the virtuous form a sort-of informal community of the like-minded who are all "friends" to each other.

"But if you hear of people who are sincere in identifying virtue with choice and the use of impressions, don't bother with whether they are members of the same family, or friends who've run together a long time; knowing this is enough to say with confidence that they are friends, just as it is enough to judge them fair and reliable."

With the attainment of virtue not only will one be "in a condition to befriend others - forming easy and natural relationships with like-minded people" but also one will know how to treat those who are not virtuous. Here Epictetus is tolerant, if pitying, when he notes that the virtuous are:

"...capable too of treating unenlightened souls with sympathy and indulgence, remembering that they are ignorant or mistaken about what's most important."

Why natural science

According to Epicurus, natural science frees us from superstition (or "myth"). We need to be free of superstitions because superstitions provoke anxiety (a form of pain, and pain in evil).

"Live your life without attracting attention."

"Happiness and blessedness do not belong to abundance of riches or exalted position or offices or power, but to freedom from pain and gentleness of feeling and a state of mind that sets limits that are in accordance with nature." - Epicurus

Praise from others

"Praise from others must follow of its own accord; our object should be our own healing."

- Epicurus

How justice operates without help from the gods

"There is no such thing as 'justice in itself'; it is, rather, always a certain compact made during men's dealings with one another in different places, not to do harm or to be harmed."

"It is impossible for one who commits some act in secret violation of the compacts made among men not to do harm or to be harmed, to remain confident that he will escape notice, even if for the present he escapes detection a thousand times. For right up to the day of his death, it remains unclear whether he will escape detection."

- Epicurus

Kahneman, Epicurus, Happiness

1. Commuting, promotions and happiness: Epicurus warns us not to pursue unnecessary things like wealth and status, because the desire for these things is never satisfied and they lead to more pain than pleasure. Kahneman warns simply against pursuing a promotion that means more time in the office away from family and friends, or a longer commute that lengthens the worst part of your day.

"Many men who acquire wealth do not find deliverance from evils but an exchange of their present evils for greater ones." - Epicurus

Tacitus finds this view in Stoic thought as well:

With regard to practical matters they maintain that popular ideas of good and bad are wrong: many people who appear to be in dire circumstances are actually happy provided they deal with their situation bravely; others, regardless of how many possessions they have, are miserable, because they do not know how to use the gifts of fortune wisely.

2. Friends: For Epicurus, friendship is the key to happiness. Kahneman simply observes that people report being happiest when they are socializing with friends.

Friendship

"Of all the things that wisdom provides for living one's entire life in happiness, the greatest by far is the possession of friendship."

"The same knowledge that makes one confident that nothing dreadful is eternal or long-lasting, also recognizes in the face of these limited evils the security afforded by friendship."

Note that friendship is an outgrowth of virtue. It is the virtue of wisdom that provides for the possession of friendship. Is that because without virtue we would not attract friends, or not know how to act in order to keep them, or would fail to prize them highly enough to maintain the friendship?

- Epicurus

Don't fool yourself into pursuing unnecesary things that bring great hassles...

"He who understands the limits of life knows how easy it is to remove the pain that results from want and to make one's whole life complete. As a result, he does not need actions that bring strife in their wake."

- Epicurus

You'll never satisfy these desires anyway.

"Nothing is sufficient for the man to whom the sufficient is too little."

- Epicurus

Securing safety from others...

For Sartre, "hell is other people."

Epicurus prizes friendship, but is keenly aware of the need to protect oneself from pretty much everyone else.

A number of entries in the Principal Doctrines refer to this:
"Whatever you can provide yourself with to secure protection from men is a natural good."

"Some men wished to become esteemed and admired by everyone, thinking that in this way they would procure for themselves safety from others."

"The most perfect means for securing safety from men, which arises, to some extent, from a certain power to expel, is the assurance that comes from quietude and withdrawal from the world."

- Epicurus

Epicurus and evil

"No pleasure is evil in itself; but the means of obtaining some pleasures bring in their wake troubles many times greater than the pleasures."

"...suffering from pain or grief, which are evil."

- Epicurus

Epicurus appears to use the term "evil" lightly, synonymous with internal distress and also with "troubles" or perhaps "great troubles." These troubles appear to be external troubles, the disquieting hassles one brings into one's life by pursuing unnecessary things. This is contra the Stoics, who were very clear on this matter: nothing external is evil, or good. Good and evil exist exclusively in your heart, in the internals. "Evil" is your decision to do "evil," a product of your free will that runs contrary to the natural virtues.

Epicurus and utilitarianism, or the bias towards individualism in Epicurus...

"Epicurus [makes]... no attempt to combine hedonism with altruism. ‘The greatest happiness of the greatest number’ is a formula that has no counterpart in antiquity. The problem that occurs when the claims of self conflict with those of others was not explicitly raised by Epicurus. But it is against the egoism of his Ethics at least as much as against its hedonistic bases that Cicero's criticisms are really directed."

Introduction to Cicero's De Finibus
By Harris Rackham (1868-1944)

Ten Basic Epicurean Values

Ten Basic Epicurean Values
synthesized by Ken Mylot, epicurus.info

Epicureanism is a deeply ethical and rational way of life which was immensely popular for almost five hundred years (approximately 300 B.C. to 200 A.D.). Based upon a thoroughly scientific understanding of the universe, it teaches that the way to happiness is simple and available to everyone. Here are some of its most cherished values)

1-5 have to do with ourselves)

1) Prudence
2) Self-management
3) Self-sufficiency
4) Serenity
5) Simplicity

6-10 have to do with our relationship with others)

6) Friendliness
7) Honesty
8) Generosity
9) Cheerfulness
10) Gentleness

Eight Epicurean Counsels

Eight Epicurean Counsels
sythesized by Ken Mylot, Epicurus.info

Epicureanism was never meant to be a dry academic philosophy but a vital way of living which would free men and women from a life of unhappiness, fear and anxiety.

Epicureanism is a missionary philosophy, and while epicureans have written scholarly works, they have always been very interested in explaining this way of life in a manner simple enough for anyone to understand and remember.

The following eight counsels are a basic guide to Epicurean living.

1) Don't fear God.
2) Don't worry about death.
3) Don't fear pain.
4) Live simply.
5) Pursue pleasure wisely.
6) Make friends and be a good friend.
7) Be honest in your business and private life.
8) Avoid fame and political ambition.

View every new day as if it is your last...

"Amid hopes and cares, amid fears and passions, believe that every day that has dawned is your last. Gratefully will arrive to you another hour unhoped for." - Horace (Epicurean)

"You could leave life right now. Let that determine what you do and say and think." - Marcus Aurelius

And what do you make of this?
"Everyone departs from life as if he had just been born." - Epicurus
Is this a view from the deathbed, when the life that is passing away appears impossibly brief? Or does this mean something else?

Albert Ellis, like Epicurus

Albert Ellis, like Epicurus, asserts that our judgements about pain are often far more painful than the pain itself. For Ellis, it is the belief that the pain or setback is "awful" and "unbearable" that creates the real human misery. The pain itself, no matter how bad, generally pales in comparison to the distress caused by these judgements.

De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum - Cicero

In this selection from book I, sections 9 through 21, Lucius Torquatus delivers a monologue explaining and defending Epicurean ethics:

IX. I will start then in the manner approved by the author of the system himself, by settling what are the essence and qualities of the thing that is the object of our inquiry; not that I suppose you to be ignorant of it, but because this is the logical method of procedure. We are inquiring, then, what is the final and ultimate Good, which as all philosophers are agreed must be of such a nature as to be the End to which all other things are means, while it is not itself a means to anything else. This Epicurus finds in pleasure; pleasure he holds to be the Chief Good, pain the Chief Evil. This he sets out to prove as follows: Every animal, as soon as it is born, seeks for pleasure, and delights in it as the Chief Good, while it recoils from pain as the Chief Evil, and so far as possible avoids it. This it does as long as it remains unperverted, at the prompting of Nature's own unbiased and honest verdict.

Hence Epicurus refuses to admit any necessity for argument or discussion to prove that pleasure is desirable and pain to be avoided. These facts, be thinks, are perceived by the senses, as that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet, none of which things need be proved by elaborate argument: it is enough merely to draw attention to them. (For there is a difference, he holds, between formal syllogistic proof of a thing and a mere notice or reminder: the former is the method for discovering abstruse and recondite truths, the latter for indicating facts that are obvious and evident.) Strip mankind of sensation, and nothing remains; it follows that Nature herself is the judge of that which is in accordance with or contrary to nature.

What does Nature perceive or what does she judge of, beside pleasure and pain, to guide her actions of desire and of avoidance? Some members of our school however would refine upon this doctrine; these say that it is not enough for the judgment of good and evil to rest with the senses; the facts that pleasure is in and for itself desirable and pain in and for itself to be avoided can also be grasped by the intellect and the reason. Accordingly they declare that the perception that the one is to be sought after and the other avoided is a notion naturally implanted in our minds. Others again, with whom I agree, observing that a great many philosophers do advance a vast array of reasons to prove why pleasure should not be counted as a good nor pain as an evil, consider that we had better not be too confident of our case; in their view it requires elaborate and reasoned argument, and abstruse theoretical discussion of the nature of pleasure and pain.

X. But I must explain to you how all this mistaken idea of reprobating pleasure and extolling pain arose. To do so, I will give you a complete account of the system, and expound the actual teachings of the great explorer of the truth, the master-builder of human happiness. No one rejects, dislikes or avoids pleasure itself, because it is pleasure, but because those who do not know how to pursue pleasure rationally encounter consequences that are extremely painful. Nor again is there anyone who loves or pursues or desires to obtain pain of itself, because it is pain, but because occasionally circumstances occur in which toil and pain can procure him some great pleasure. To take a trivial example, which of us ever undertakes laborious physical exercise, except to obtain some advantage from it? But who has any right to find fault with a man who chooses to enjoy a pleasure that has no annoying consequences, or one who avoids a pain that produces no resultant pleasure?

On the other hand, we denounce with righteous indignation and dislike men who are so beguiled and demoralized by the charms of the pleasure of the moment, so blinded by desire, that they cannot foresee the pain and trouble that are bound to ensue; and equal blame belongs to those who fail in their duty through weakness of will, which is the same as saying through shrinking from toil and pain. These cases are perfectly simple and easy to distinguish. In a free hour, when our power of choice is untrammelled and when nothing prevents our being able to do what we like best, every pleasure is to be welcomed and every pain avoided.

But in certain emergencies and owing to the claims of duty or the obligations of business it will frequently occur that pleasures have to be repudiated and annoyances accepted. The wise man therefore always holds in these matters to this principle of selection: he rejects pleasures to secure other greater pleasures, or else he endures pains to avoid worse pains.

This being the theory I hold, why need I be afraid of not being able to reconcile it with the case of the Torquati my ancestors? Your references to them just now were historically correct, and also showed your kind and friendly feeling towards myself; but the same I am not to be bribed by your flattery of my family, and you will not find me a less resolute opponent. Tell me, pray, what explanation do you put upon their actions? Do you really believe that they charged an armed enemy, or treated their children, their own flesh and blood, so cruelly, without a thought for their own interest or advantage? Why, even wild animals do not act in that way; they do not run amok so blindly that we cannot discern any purpose in their movements and their onslaughts.

Can you then suppose that those heroic men performed their famous deeds without any motive at all? What their motive was, I will consider later on: for the present I will confidently assert, that if they had a motive for those undoubtedly glorious exploits, that motive was not a love of virtue in and for itself.—He wrested the necklet from his foe.—Yes, and saved himself from death. But he braved great danger.—Yes, before the eyes of an army.—What did he get by it?—Honor and esteem, the strongest guarantees of security in life.—He sentenced his own son to death.—If from no motive, I am sorry to be the descendant of anyone so savage and inhuman; but if his purpose was by inflicting pain upon himself to establish his authority as a commander, and to tighten the reins of discipline during a very serious war by holding over his army the fear of punishment, then his action aimed at ensuring the safety of his fellow citizens, upon which he knew his own depended.

And this is a principle of wide application. People of your school, and especially yourself, who are so diligent a student of history, have found a favorite field for the display of your eloquence in recalling the stories of brave and famous men of old, and in praising their actions, not on utilitarian grounds, but on account of the splendor of abstract moral worth. But all of this falls to the ground if the principle of selection that I have just mentioned be established,—the principle of forgoing pleasures for the purpose of getting greater pleasures, and enduring, pains for the sake of escaping greater pains.

XI. But enough has been said at this stage about the glorious exploits and achievements of the heroes of renown. The tendency of all of the virtues to produce pleasure is a topic that will be treated in its own place later on. At present I shall proceed to expound the essence and qualities of pleasure itself, and shall endeavor to remove the misconceptions of ignorance and to make you realize how serious, how temperate, how austere is the school that is supposed to be sensual, lax, and luxurious. The pleasure we pursue is not that kind alone which directly affects our physical being with a delightful feeling,—a positively agreeable perception of the senses; on the contrary, the greatest pleasure according to us is that which is experienced as a result of the complete removal of pain. When we are released from pain, the mere sensation of complete emancipation and relief from uneasiness is in itself a source of gratification.

But everything that causes gratification is a pleasure (just as everything that causes annoyance is a pain). Therefore the complete removal of pain has correctly been termed a pleasure. For example, when hunger and thirst are banished by food and drink, the mere fact of getting rid of uneasiness brings a resultant pleasure in its train. So generally, the removal of pain causes pleasure to take its place.

Epicurus consequently maintained that there is no such thing as a neutral state of feeling intermediate between pleasure and pain; for the state supposed by some thinkers to be neutral, being characterized as it is by entire absence of pain, is itself, he held, a pleasure, and, what is more, a pleasure of the highest order. A man who is conscious of his condition at all must necessarily feel either pleasure or pain.

But complete absence of pain Epicurus considers to be the limit and highest point of pleasure; beyond this point pleasure may vary in kind, but it cannot vary in intensity or degree. Yet at Athens, so my father used to tell me when lie wanted to air his wit at the expense of the Stoics, in the Ceramicus there is actually a statue of Chrysippus seated and holding out one hand, the gesture being intended to indicate the delight which he used to take in the following little syllogism: “Does your hand want anything, while it is in its present condition?” Answer: “No,nothing.”—“But if pleasure were a good, it would want pleasure.”—“Yes, I suppose it would.”—“Therefore pleasure is not a good.”

An argument, as my father declared, which not even a statue would employ, if a statue could speak; because though it is cogent enough as an objection to the Cyrenaics, it does not touch Epicurus. For if the only kind of pleasure were that which so to speak tickles the senses, an influence permeating them with a feeling of delight, neither the hand nor any other member could be satisfied with the absence of pain unaccompanied by an agreeable and active sensation of pleasure. Whereas if, as Epicurus holds, the highest pleasure be to feel no pain, Chrysippus's interlocutor, though justified in making his first admission, that his hand in that condition wanted nothing, was not justified in his second admission, that if pleasure were a good, his hand would have wanted it.

And the reason why it would not have wanted pleasure is that to be without pain is to be in a state of pleasure.

XII. The truth of the position that pleasure is the ultimate good will most readily appear from the following illustration. Let us imagine a man living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain: what possible state of existence could we describe as being more excellent or more desirable? One so situated must possess in the first place a strength of mind that is proof against all fear of death or of pain; he will know that death means complete unconsciousness, and that pain is generally light if long and short if strong, so that its intensity is compensated by brief duration and its continuance by diminishing severity. Let such a man moreover have no dread of any supernatural power; let him never suffer the pleasures of the past to fade away, but constantly renew their enjoyment in recollection, and his lot will be one which will not admit of further improvement.

Suppose on the other hand a person crushed beneath the heaviest load of mental and of bodily anguish to which humanity is liable. Grant him no hope of ultimate relief in view also give him no pleasure either present or in prospect. Can one describe or imagine a more pitiable state? If then a life full of pain is the thing most to be avoided, it follows that to live in pain is the highest evil; and this position implies that a life of pleasure is the ultimate good. In fact the mind possesses nothing in itself upon which it can rest as final. Every fear, every sorrow can be traced back to pain; there is no other thing besides pain which is of its own nature capable of causing either anxiety or distress.

Pleasure and pain moreover supply the motives of desire and of avoidance, and the springs of conduct generally. This being so, it clearly follows that actions are right and praiseworthy only as being a means to the attainment of a life of pleasure. But that which is not itself a means to anything else, but to which all else is a means, is what the Greeks term the Telos, the highest, ultimate or final Good. It must therefore be admitted that the Chief Good is to live agreeably.

XIII. Those who place the Chief Good in virtue alone are beguiled by the glamour of a name, and do not understand the true demands of nature. If they will consent to listen to Epicurus, they will be delivered from the grossest error. Your school dilates on the transcendent beauty of the virtues; but were they not productive of pleasure, who would deem them either praiseworthy or desirable? We esteem the art of medicine not for its interest as a science, but for its conduciveness to health; the art of navigation is commended for its practical and not its scientific value, because it conveys the rules for sailing a ship with success. So also Wisdom, which must be considered as the art of living, if it effected no result would not be desired; but as it is, it is desired, because it is the artificer that procures and produces pleasure. (The meaning that I attach to pleasure must by this time be clear to you, and you must not be biased against my argument owing to the discreditable associations of the term.)

The great disturbing factor in a man's life is ignorance of good and evil; mistaken ideas about these frequently rob us of our greatest pleasures, and torment us with the most cruel pain of mind. Hence we need the aid of Wisdom, to rid us of our fears and appetites, to root out all our errors and prejudices, and to serve as our infallible guide to the attainment of pleasure. Wisdom alone can banish sorrow from our hearts and protect its front alarm and apprehension; put yourself to school with her, and you may live in peace, and quench the glowing flames of desire. For the desires are incapable of satisfaction; they ruin not individuals only but whole families, nay often shake the very foundations of the state. It is they that are the source of hatred, quarreling, and strife, of sedition and of war.

Nor do they only flaunt themselves abroad, or turn their blind onslaughts solely against others; even when prisoned within the heart they quarrel and fall out among themselves; and this cannot but render the whole of life embittered. Hence only the Wise Man, who prunes away all the rank growth of vanity and error, can possibly live untroubled by sorrow and by fear, content within the bounds that nature has set. Nothing could be more useful or more conducive to well-being than Epicurus's doctrine as to the different classes of the desires. One kind he classified as both natural and necessary, a second as natural without being necessary, and a third as neither natural nor necessary; the principle of classification being that the necessary desires are gratified with little trouble or expense; the natural desires also require but little, since nature's own riches, which suffice to content her, are both easily procured and limited in amount; but for the imaginary desires no bound or limit can be discovered.

XIV. If then we observe that ignorance and error reduce the whole of life to confusion, while Wisdom alone is able to protect us from the onslaughts of appetite and the menaces of fear, teaching us to bear even the affronts of fortune with moderation, and showing us all the paths that lead to calmness and to peace, why should we hesitate to avow that Wisdom is to be desired for the sake of the pleasures it brings and Folly to be avoided because of its injurious consequences?

The same principle will lead us to pronounce that Temperance also is not desirable for its own sake, but because it bestows peace of mind, and soothes the heart with a tranquilizing sense of harmony. For it is temperance that warns us to be guided by reason in what we desire and avoid. Nor is it enough to judge what it is right to do or to leave undone; we also need to abide by our judgment. Most men however lack tenacity of purpose; their resolution weakens and succumbs as soon as the fair form of pleasure meets their gaze, and they surrender themselves prisoners to their passions, failing to foresee the inevitable result. Thus for the sake of a pleasure at once small in amount and unnecessary, and one which they might have procured by other means or even denied themselves altogether without pain, they incur serious disease, or loss of fortune, or disgrace, and not infrequently become liable to the penalties of the law and of the courts of justice.

Those on the other hand who are resolved so to enjoy their pleasures as to avoid all painful consequences therefrom, and who retain their faculty of judgment and avoid being seduced by pleasure into courses that they perceive to be wrong, reap the very highest pleasure by forgoing pleasure. Similarly also they often voluntarily endure pain, to avoid incurring greater pain by not doing so. This clearly proves that Intemperance is not undesirable for its own sake, while Temperance is desirable not because it renounces pleasures, but because it procures greater pleasures.

XV. The same account will be found to hold good of Courage. The performance of labors, the undergoing of pains, are not in themselves attractive, nor are endurance, industry, watchfulness, nor yet that much lauded virtue, perseverance, nor even courage; but we aim at these virtues in order to live without anxiety and fear and so far as possible to be free from pain of mind and body. The fear of death plays havoc with the calm and even tenor of life, and to bow the head to pain and bear it abjectly and feebly is a pitiable thing; such weakness has caused many men to betray their parents or their friends, some their country, and very many utterly to ruin themselves. So on the other hand a strong and lofty spirit is entirely free from anxiety and sorrow.

It makes light of death, for the dead are only as they were before they were born. It is schooled to encounter pain by recollecting that pains of great severity are ended by death, and slight ones have frequent intervals of respite; while those of medium intensity lie within our own control: we can bear them if they are endurable, or if they are not, we may serenely quit life's theater, when the play has ceased to please us. These considerations prove that timidity and cowardice are not blamed, nor courage and endurance praised, on their own account; the former are rejected because they beget pain, the latter coveted because they beget pleasure.

XVI. It remains to speak of Justice, to complete the list of the virtues; but this admits of practically the same treatment as the others. Wisdom, Temperance, and Courage I have shown to be so closely linked with Pleasure that they cannot possibly be severed or sundered from it. The same must be deemed to be the case with Justice. Not only does Justice never cause anyone harm, but on the contrary it always adds some benefit, partly owing to its essentially tranquilizing influence upon the mind, partly because of the hope that it warrants of a never-failing supply of the things that uncorrupted nature really needs. And just as Rashness, License, and Cowardice ever torment the mind, ever awakening trouble and discord, so Unrighteousness, when firmly rooted in the heart, causes restlessness by the mere fact of its presence; and if once it has found expression in some deed of wickedness, however secret the act, yet it can never feel assured that it will always remain undetected.

The usual consequences of crime are, first suspicion, next gossip and rumor, then comes the accuser, then the judge; many wrongdoers have even turned evidence against themselves, as happened in your consulship. And even if any think themselves well fenced and fortified against detection by their fellow men, they still dread the eye of heaven, and fancy that the pangs of anxiety night and day gnawing at their hearts are sent by Providence to punish them. But what can wickedness contribute towards lessening the annoyances of life, commensurate with its effect in increasing them, owing to the burden of a guilty conscience, the penalties of the law and the hatred of one's fellows?

Yet nevertheless some men indulge without limit their avarice, ambition and love of power, lust, gluttony and those other desires, which ill-gotten gains can never diminish but rather must inflame the more; inasmuch that they appear proper subjects for restraint rather than for reformation. Men of sound natures, therefore, are summoned by the voice of true reason to justice, equity, and honesty. For one without eloquence or resources dishonesty is not good policy, since it is difficult for such a man to succeed in his designs, or to make good his success when once achieved.

On the other hand, for the rich and clever generous conduct seems more in keeping, and liberality wins them affection and good will, the surest means to a life of peace; especially as there really is no motive for transgressing since the desires that spring from nature are easily gratified without doing any man wrong, while those that are imaginary ought to be resisted, for they set their affections upon nothing that is really wanted; while there is more loss inherent in Injustice itself than there is profit in the gains it brings.

Hence Justice also cannot correctly be said to be desirable in and for itself; it is so because it is so highly productive of gratification. For esteem and affection are gratifying, because they render life safer and fuller of pleasure. Hence we hold that Unrighteousness is to be avoided not simply on account of the disadvantages that result from being unrighteous, but even far more because when it dwells in a man's heart it never suffers him to breathe freely or know a moment's rest.

If then even the glory of the Virtues, on which all the other philosophers love to expatiate so eloquently, has in the last resort no meaning unless it be based on pleasure, whereas pleasure is the only thing that is intrinsically attractive and alluring, it cannot be doubted that pleasure is the one supreme and final Good and that a life of happiness is nothing else than a life of pleasure.

XVII. The doctrine thus firmly established has corollaries which I will briefly expound. (1)The Ends of Goods and Evils themselves, that is, pleasure and pain, are not open to mistake; where people go wrong is in not knowing what things are productive of pleasure and pain.

(2) Again, we aver that mental pleasures and pains arise out of bodily ones (and therefore I allow your contention that any Epicureans who think otherwise put themselves out of court; and I am aware that many do, though not those who can speak with authority); but although men do experience mental pleasure that is agreeable and mental pain that is annoying, yet both of these we assert arise out of and are based upon bodily sensations.

(3) Yet we maintain that this does not preclude mental pleasures and pains from being much more intense than those of the body; since the body can feel only what is present to it at the moment, whereas the mind is also cognizant of the past and of the future. For granting that pain of body is equally painful, yet our sensation of pain can be enormously increased by the belief that some evil of unlimited magnitude and duration threatens to befall us hereafter. And the same consideration may be transferred to pleasure: a pleasure is greater if not accompanied by any apprehension of evil. This therefore clearly appears, that intense mental pleasure or distress contributes more to our happiness or misery than a bodily pleasure or pain of equal duration.

(4) But we do not agree that when pleasure is withdrawn uneasiness at once ensues, unless the pleasure happens to have been replaced by a pain: while on the other hand one is glad to lose a pain even though no active sensation of pleasure comes in its place: a fact that serves to show how great a pleasure is the mere absence of pain.

(5) But just as we are elated by the anticipation of good things, so we are delighted by their recollection. Fools are tormented by the memory of former evils; wise men have the delight of renewing in grateful remembrance the blessings of the past. We have the power both to obliterate our misfortunes in an almost perpetual forgetfulness and to summon up pleasant and agreeable memories of our successes. But when we fix our mental vision closely on the events of the past, then sorrow or gladness ensues according as these were evil or good.

XVIII. Here is indeed a royal road to happiness—open, simple, and direct! For clearly man can have no greater good than complete freedom from pain and sorrow coupled with the enjoyment of the highest bodily and mental pleasures. Notice then how the theory embraces every possible enhancement of life, every aid to the attainment of that Chief Good which is our object. Epicurus, the man whom you denounce as a voluptuary, cries aloud that no one can live pleasantly without living wisely, honorably, and justly, and no one wisely, honorably, and justly without living pleasantly. For a city rent by faction cannot prosper, nor a house whose masters are at strife; much less then can a mind divided against itself and filled with inward discord taste any particle of pure and liberal pleasure. But one who is perpetually swayed by conflicting and incompatible counsels and desires can know no peace or calm.

Why, if the pleasantness of life is diminished by the more serious bodily diseases, how much more must it be diminished by the diseases of the mind! But extravagant and imaginary desires, for riches, fame, power, and also for licentious pleasures, are nothing but mental diseases. Then, too, there are grief, trouble and sorrow, which gnaw the heart and consume it with anxiety, if men fail to realize that the mind need feel no pain unconnected with some pain of body, present or to come. Yet there is no foolish man but is afflicted by some one of these diseases; therefore there is no foolish man that is not unhappy.

Moreover, there is death, the stone of Tantalus ever hanging over men's heads; and superstition, that poisons and destroys all peace of mind. Besides, they do not recollect their past nor enjoy their present blessings; they merely look forward to those of the future, and as these are of necessity uncertain, they are consumed with agony and terror; and the climax of their torment is when they perceive too late that all their dreams of wealth or station, power or fame, have come to nothing. For they never attain any of the pleasures, the hope of which inspired them to undergo all their arduous toils. Or look again at others, petty, narrow-minded men, or confirmed pessimists, or spiteful, envious, ill-tempered creatures, unsociable, abusive, brutal; others again enslaved to the follies of love, impudent or reckless, wanton, headstrong and yet irresolute, always changing their minds. Such failings render their lives one unbroken round of misery.

The conclusion is that no foolish man can be happy, nor any wise man fail to be happy. This is a truth that we establish far more conclusively than do the Stoics. For they maintain that nothing is good save that vague phantom which they entitle Moral Worth, a title more splendid than substantial; and say that Virtue resting on this Moral Worth has no need of pleasure, but is herself her own sufficient happiness.

XIX. At the same time this Stoic doctrine can be stated in a form which we do not object to, and indeed ourselves endorse. For Epicurus thus presents his Wise Man who is always happy: his desires are kept within bounds; death he disregards; he has a true conception, untainted by fear, of the Divine nature; he does not hesitate to depart from life, if that would better his condition. Thus equipped he enjoys perpetual pleasure, for there is no moment when the pleasures he experiences do not outbalance the pains; since he remembers the past with gratitude, grasps the present with a full realization of its pleasantness, and does not rely upon the future; he looks forward to it, but finds his true enjoyment in the present. Also he is entirely free from the vices that I instanced a few moments ago, and he derives no inconsiderable pleasure from comparing his own existence with the life of the foolish.

Moreover, any pains that the Wise Man may encounter are never so severe but that he has more cause for gladness than for sorrow. Again, it is a fine saying of Epicurus that “the Wise Man is but little interfered with by fortune: the great concerns of life, the things that matter, are controlled by his own wisdom and reason”; and that “no greater pleasure could be derived from a life of infinite duration than is actually afforded by this existence which we know to be finite.” Logic, on which your school lays such stress, he held to be of no effect either as a guide to conduct or as an aid to thought.

Natural Philosophy he deemed all-important. This science explains to us the meaning of terms, the nature of predication, and the law of consistency and contradiction; secondly, a thorough knowledge of the facts of nature relieves us of the burden of superstition, frees us from fear of death, and shields us against the disturbing effects of ignorance, which is often in itself a cause of terrifying apprehensions; lastly, to learn what nature's real requirements are improves the moral character also. Besides, it is only by firmly grasping a well-established scientific system, observing the Rule or Canon that has fallen as it were from heaven so that all men may know it—only by making that Canon the test of all our judgments, that we can hope always to stand fast in our belief, unshaken by the eloquence of any man.

On the other hand, without a full understanding of the world of nature it is impossible to maintain the truth of our sense-perceptions. Further, every mental presentation has its origin in sensation: so that no certain knowledge will be possible, unless all sensations are true, as the theory of Epicurus teaches that they are. Those who deny the validity of sensation and say that nothing can be perceived, having excluded the evidence of the senses, are unable even to expound their own argument. Besides, by abolishing knowledge and science they abolish all possibility of rational life and action. Thus Natural Philosophy supplies courage to face the fear of death; resolution to resist the terrors of religion; peace of mind, for it removes all ignorance of the mysteries of nature; self-control, for it explains the nature of the desires and distinguishes their different kinds; and, as I showed just now, the Canon or Criterion of Knowledge, which Epicurus also established, gives a method of discerning truth from falsehood.

XX. There remains a topic that is pre-eminently germane to this discussion, I mean the subject of Friendship. Your school maintains that if pleasure be the Chief Good, friendship will cease to exist. Now Epicurus's pronouncement about friendship is that of all the means to happiness that wisdom has devised, none is greater, none more fruitful, none more delightful than this. Nor did he only commend this doctrine by his eloquence, but far more by the example of his life and conduct. How great a thing such friendship is, is shown by the mythical stories of antiquity. Review the legends from the remotest ages, and, copious and varied as they are, you will barely find in them three pairs of friends, beginning with Theseus and ending with Orestes. Yet Epicurus in a single house and that a small one maintained a whole company of friends, united by the closest sympathy and affection; and this still goes on in the Epicurean school.

But to return to our subject, for there is no need of personal instances: I notice that the topic of friendship has been treated by Epicureans in three ways:

(1) Some have denied that pleasures affecting our friends are in themselves to be desired by us in the same degree as we desire our own pleasures. This doctrine is thought by some critics to undermine the foundations of friendship; however, its supporters defend their position, and in my opinion have no difficulty in making good their ground. They argue that friendship can no more be sundered from pleasure than can the virtues, which we have discussed already. A solitary, friendless life must be beset by secret dangers and alarms. Hence reason itself advises the acquisition of friends; their possession gives confidence, and a firmly rooted hope of winning pleasure. And just as hatred, jealousy, and contempt are hindrances to pleasure, so friendship is the most trustworthy preserver and also creator of pleasure alike for our friends and for ourselves. It affords us enjoyment in the present, and it inspires us with hopes for the near and distant future.

Thus it is not possible to secure uninterrupted gratification in life without friendship, nor yet to preserve friendship itself unless we love our friends as much as ourselves. Hence this unselfishness does occur in friendship, while also friendship is closely linked with pleasure. For we rejoice in our friends' joy as much as in our own, and are equally pained by their sorrows. Therefore the Wise Man will feel exactly the same towards his friend as he does towards himself, and will exert himself as much for his friend's pleasure as he would for his own. All that has been said about the essential connection of the virtues with pleasure must be repeated about friendship. Epicurus well said (I give almost his exact words): “The same creed that has given us courage to overcome all fear of everlasting or long-enduring evil hereafter, has discerned that friendship is our strongest safeguard in this present term of life.”

(2) Other Epicureans though by no means lacking in insight are a little less courageous in defying the opprobrious criticisms of the Academy. They fear that if we hold friendship to be desirable only for the pleasure that it affords to ourselves, it will be thought that it is crippled altogether. They therefore say that the first advances and overtures, and the original inclination to form an attachment, are prompted by the desire for pleasure, but that when the progress of intercourse has led to intimacy, the relationship blossoms into an affection strong enough to make us love our friends for their own sake, even though no practical advantage accrues from their friendship, Does not familiarity endear to us localities, temples, cities, gymnasia, and playing-grounds, horses and hounds, gladiatorial shows and fights with wild beasts, then how much more natural and reasonable that this should be able to happen in our intercourse with our fellow-men!

(3) The third view is that wise men have made a sort of compact to love their friends no less than themselves. We can understand the possibility of this, and we often see it happen. Clearly no more effective means to happiness could be found than such an alliance.

All these considerations go to prove not only that the theory of friendship is not embarrassed by the identification of the Chief Good with pleasure, but also that without this no foundation for friendship whatsoever can be found.

XXI. If then the doctrine I have set forth is clearer and more luminous than daylight itself; if it is derived entirely from Nature's source; if my whole discourse relies throughout for confirmation on the unbiased and unimpeachable evidence of the senses; if lisping infants, nay even dumb animals, prompted by Nature's teaching, almost find voice to proclaim that there is no welfare but pleasure, no hardship but pain—and their judgment in these matters is neither sophisticated nor biased—ought we not to feel the greatest gratitude to him who caught this utterance of Nature's voice, and grasped its import so firmly and so fully that he has guided all sane-minded men into the paths of peace and happiness, calmness and repose?

You are pleased to think him uneducated. The reason is that he refused to consider any education worth the name that did not help to school us in happiness. Was he to spend his time, as you encourage Triarius and me to do, in perusing poets, who give us nothing solid and useful, but merely childish amusement? Was he to occupy himself like Plato with music and geometry, arithmetic and astronomy, which starting from false premises cannot be true, and which moreover if they were true would contribute nothing to make our lives pleasanter and therefore better? Was he, I say, to study arts like these, and neglect the master art, so difficult and correspondingly so fruitful, the art of living?

No! Epicurus was not uneducated: the real philistines are those who ask us to go on studying till old age the subjects that we ought to be ashamed not to have learnt in boyhood. I have explained my own view, but solely with the object of learning what your verdict is. I have never hitherto bad a satisfactory opportunity of hearing it.

Anger is weakness

In explaining that we have nothing to fear from the gods, Epicurus (like Marcus Aurelius) depicts anger as a form of weakness.

"The blessed and immortal is itself free from trouble nor does it cause trouble for anyone else; therefore it is not constrained either by anger or by favor. For such sentiments exist only in the weak."

- Epicurus

Impact of randomness on our lives

Letter to Menoeceus

Contra the Stoics, Epicurus is attuned to the ways in which randomness effects our lives.

"Some things happen by necessity, others as the result of chance; other things are subject to our control."

"In few instances does chance intrude upon the wise man, but reason has administered his greatest and most important affairs..."

- Epicurus

Bad things happen, but if you are living your life virtuously, then you'll be able to handle it.

Pleasantly, wisely, virtuously, justly

"Prudence teaches us how impossible it is to live pleasantly without living wisely, virtuously, and justly, just as we cannot live wisely, virtuously and justly without living pleasantly."

- Epicurus

Freedom from mental anguish

Letter to Menoeceus

"Genuine Pleasure

When we say that pleasure is the goal, we are not talking about the pleasure of profligates or that which lies in sensuality, as some ignorant persons think, or else those who do not agree with us or have followed our argument badly; rather it is freedom from bodily pain and mental anguish."

or

"The just man is most free of perturbation, while the unjust man is full of the greatest disturbance."

- Epicurus

Note "freedom from...mental anguish" as a primary goal of Epicurian philosophy. Why cultivate the virtues of prudence and justice? Because exercising these virtues produces freedom from mental anguish. We don't do it to please the gods. We do it so we can live with ourselves.

Tetrapharmakos

Don't fear god,
Don't worry about death;
What is good is easy to get, and
What is terrible is easy to endure.

What is terrible is easy to endure

Epicurus asserts that pain might be either intense or chronic, but is unlikely to be both. He says we have great ability to tolerate pain, for pain is almost always broken up by spells of pleasure (the absence of pain). And the worst part of pain is the anxiety that future pain will be unbearable (which it won't).

Death is nothing

Letter to Menoeceus

"Grow accustomed to the belief that death is nothing to us, since every good and evil lie in sensation. However, death is the deprivation of sensation. Therefore, correct understanding that death is nothing to us makes a mortal life enjoyable, not by adding an endless span of time but by taking away the longing for immortality."

- Epicurus

The gods just aren't really paying attention to us...

Epicurus has an attractive formulation about the gods - they probably exists, but they don't pay attention to the affairs of men or the operation of nature - and about natural science: that without an understanding of natural science, how nature actually works, one is condemned to a lifetime fear of the gods.

"It is impossible for anyone to dispel his fear over the most important matters, if he does not know what is the nature of the universe but instead suspects something that happens in myth. Therefore, it is impossible to obtain unmitigated pleasure without natural science."

- Epicurus